Journal of Advances in Mathematics and Computer Science

The promotion of agricultural green production is mired in a governance dilemma characterized by policy implementation challenges and farmer reluctance, rooted in the complex strategic interactions among micro-level stakeholders. Leveraging the dual role of village committees as both a policy transmission hub and a cornerstone of rural society, this paper constructs an asymmetric evolutionary game model to analyze the behavioral interactions between village committees and agricultural producers. By defining the strategy sets and payoff matrices for both parties, the replicator dynamics of the system are derived, and local stability analysis is conducted using the Jacobian matrix to identify key Evolutionary Stable Strategies(ESS). The findings reveal that the system’s evolutionary trajectory does not converge to a unique equilibrium but is critically dependent on cost-benefit parameters. The optimal equilibrium (1,1)—where village committees promote green production and farmers adopt it—requires a stringent benefit distribution mechanism, driven by factors such as the village committee’s revenue share coefficient e, product price premium P,and collaborative returns R_s. Conversely, the Pareto-inefficient equilibrium (1,0)—where village committees promote green production but farmers refuse to participate—stems from specific cost structures. Numerical simulations further verify that the system tends to converge toward a cooperative equilibrium when the benefit distribution coefficient e falls within an appropriate interval. Both government subsidies S_f and environmental synergistic benefits R_s significantly promote cooperation. This study is the first to reveal the ”dual-threshold effect” of the benefit distribution coefficient, providing a micro-level theoretical foundation and quantitative evidence for addressing bottlenecks in agricultural green cooperation. The policy implications include implementing targeted interventions, designing incentive-compatible distribution mechanisms, and integrating economic incentives with the cultivation of social norms to advance sustainable cooperation in grassroots green governance.