Journal of Advances in Mathematics and Computer Science

Correcting market failures in green innovation requires coordinated efforts from the government, market, and society. Breaking through the limitation of analyzing a single policy instrument, this study follows a mixed research paradigm of “phenomenon observation – theoretical deduction – numerical simulation.” Based on statistical analysis of data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2024, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving local governments, enterprises, and the public to explain the underlying dynamic game mechanisms. Parameters derived from statistical analysis are further used to support numerical simulations, aiming to reveal the dynamic mechanism through which fiscal subsidies drive corporate green innovation under multi-actor interaction.

The results show that: (1) government environmental subsidies are the core driving force that encourages enterprises to overcome the cost barrier of innovation, and the incentive effect is stronger for high-carbon enterprises; (2) subsidies are transformed into innovation outputs through the pathway of inducing R&D investment, with a significant mediating effect; and (3) environmental regulation intensity and market competition significantly positively moderate the effect of subsidies.

The conclusions indicate that constructing a composite governance system characterized by balanced rewards and punishments, market coordination, and social co-governance is key to improving subsidy efficiency and promoting the green transformation of enterprises. In particular, public participation plays a crucial role in enhancing policy effectiveness and guiding corporate behavior; however, its practical implementation may face challenges such as participation constraints and information asymmetry, which should be addressed in future policy design.